Predestination and free will

c. 386–398 · John Chrysostom, Homilies on the Epistle to the Romans 16

Yet, “all,” he says, “have sinned, and come short of the glory of God.” (Rom. iii. 23.) Now if all have sinned, how come some to be saved, and some to perish? It is because all were not minded to come to Him, since for His part all were saved, for all were called.

418 · Augustine of Hippo, On the Grace of Christ, and on Original Sin (De gratia Christi et de peccato originali) 1.31.34

And what of his other statement too, “By grace are ye saved”?—where, that he might prevent men’s supposing that it is by works, he expressly added, “by faith.” And yet further, lest it should be imagined that faith itself is to be attributed to men independently of the grace of God, the apostle says: “And that not of yourselves; for it is the gift of God.” It follows, therefore, that we receive, without any merit of our own, that from which everything which, according to them, we obtain because of our merit, has its beginning—that is, faith itself. If, however, they insist on denying that this is freely given to us, what is the meaning of the apostle’s words: “According as God hath dealt to every man the measure of faith”? But if it is contended that faith is so bestowed as to be a recompense for merit, not a free gift, what then becomes of another saying of the apostle: “Unto you it is given in the behalf of Christ, not only to believe in Him, but also to suffer for His sake”? Each is by the apostle’s testimony made a gift,—both that he believes in Christ, and that each suffers for His sake. These men however, attribute faith to free will in such a way as to make it appear that grace is rendered to faith not as a gratuitous gift, but as a debt—thus ceasing to be grace any longer, because that is not grace which is not gratuitous.

428–429 · Augustine of Hippo, On the Gift of Perseverance (De dono perseverantiae) 22.58

Now, therefore, the definite determination of God’s will concerning predestination is of such a kind that some from unbelief receive the will to obey, and are converted to the faith or persevere in the faith, while others who abide in the delight of damnable sins, even if they have been predestinated, have not yet arisen, because the aid of pitying grace has not yet lifted them up. For if any are not yet called whom by His grace He has predestinated to be elected, they will receive that grace whereby they may will to be elected, and may be so; and if any obey, but have not been predestinated to His kingdom and glory, they are for a season, and will not abide in the same obedience to the end.

428–429 · Augustine of Hippo, On the Gift of Perseverance (De dono perseverantiae) 22.60

Moreover, what follows where it is said, “But yet if any of you are not yet called, whom by his grace He has predestinated to be called, you shall receive that grace whereby you shall will to be, and be, elected,” is said more hardly than it could be said if we consider that we are speaking not to men in general, but to the Church of Christ. For why is it not rather said thus: “And if any of you are not yet called, let us pray for them that they may be called. For perchance they are so predestinated as to be granted to our prayers, and to receive that grace whereby they may will, and be made elected”? For God, who fulfilled all that He predestinated, has willed us also to pray for the enemies of the faith, that we might hence understand that He Himself also gives to the unbelievers the gift of faith, and makes willing men out of those that were unwilling.

1261–1264 · Thomas Aquinas, Of God and His Creatures: An Annotated Translation (With some Abridgement) of the Summa contra Gentiles 3.164

In point of this distinction, inasmuch as some He has reprobated and some He has predestined, we speak of the divine ‘election,’ of which it is said: He hath elected us in him before the constitution of the world (Eph. i, 4). Thus it appears that predestination and election and reprobation is a part of divine providence, according as by the said providence men are guided to their last end. And it may be shown that predestination and election do not induce necessity, by the same arguments whereby it was shown that divine providence does not take away contingency from creation (Chap. LXXII). But that predestination and election have no cause in any human merits may be shown, not only by the fact that the grace of God, an effect of predestination, is not preceded by any merits, but precedes all merit, but also by this further fact, that the divine will and providence is the first cause of all things that are made. Nothing can be cause of the will and providence of God; although of the effects of providence, and of the effects of predestination, one effect may be cause of another.

1265–1273 · Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I-II, q. 112, a. 3, s.c.

On the contrary, Man is compared to God as clay to the potter, according to Jer. 18:6: "As clay is in the hand of the potter, so are you in My hand." But however much the clay is prepared, it does not necessarily receive its shape from the potter. Hence, however much a man prepares himself, he does not necessarily receive grace from God. I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), man's preparation for grace is from God, as Mover, and from the free-will, as moved. Hence the preparation may be looked at in two ways: first, as it is from free-will, and thus there is no necessity that it should obtain grace, since the gift of grace exceeds every preparation of human power. But it may be considered, secondly, as it is from God the Mover, and thus it has a necessity---not indeed of coercion, but of infallibility---as regards what it is ordained to by God, since God's intention cannot fail, according to the saying of Augustine in his book on the Predestination of the Saints (De Dono Persev. xiv) that "by God's good gifts whoever is liberated, is most certainly liberated." Hence if God intends, while moving, that the one whose heart He moves should attain to grace, he will infallibly attain to it, according to Jn. 6:45: "Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me."

1554 · John Calvin, Commentary on Acts, part 2 (chapters 14-28) 22.14

God, saith he, hath ordained thee to know his will. For by this means Paul is taught that God had respect unto him at such time as he went astray, and was altogether an enemy to his own salvation; and so God’s predestination doth abolish all preparations which sophisters imagine, as if man did prevent God’s grace by his own free will.

1642 · John Owen, A Display of Arminianism 14

Not that I would assert, in opposition to this, such an operation of grace as should, as it were, violently overcome the will of man, and force him to obedience, which must needs be prejudicial unto our liberty; but only consisting in such a sweet effectual working as doth infallibly promote our conversion, make us willing who before were unwilling, and obedient who were not obedient, that createth clean hearts and reneweth right spirits within us.

1642 · John Owen, A Display of Arminianism 6

We choose Christ by faith; God chooseth us by his decree of election. The question is, Whether we choose him because he hath chosen us, or he chooseth us because we have chosen him, and so indeed choose ourselves? We affirm the former, and that because our choice of him is a gift he himself bestoweth only on them whom he hath chosen. Sixthly, and principally, The effects of election, infallibly following it, cannot be the causes of election, certainly preceding it. This is evident, for nothing can be the cause and the effect of the same thing, before and after itself. But all our faith, our obedience, repentance, good works, are the effects of election, flowing from it as their proper fountain, erected on it as the foundation of this spiritual building; and for this the article of our church is evident and clear.

1754 · Jonathan Edwards, A Careful and Strict Enquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of the Freedom of Will 4.14

If the beginning of true faith and holiness, and a man becoming a true saint at first, does not depend on the self-determining power of the Will, but on the determining efficacious grace of God; it may well be argued, that it is also with respect to men being continued saints, or persevering in faith and holiness. The conversion of a sinner being not owing to a man’s self-determination, but to God’s determination, and eternal election, which is absolute, and depending on the sovereign Will of God, and not on the free Will of man; as is evident from what has been said: and it being very evident from the Scriptures, that the eternal election of saints to faith and holiness, is also an election of them to eternal salvation; hence their appointment to salvation must also be absolute, and not depending on their contingent, self-determining Will. From all which it follows, that it is absolutely fixed in God’s decree, that all true saints shall persevere to actual eternal salvation.

1871 · Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, vol. 2 (Part II, Anthropology; Part III, Soteriology, chapters I-XIV) 3.14.4

If the Augustinian doctrine concerning the natural state of man since the fall, and the sovereignty of God in election, be Scriptural, then it is certain that sufficient grace does not become efficacious from the coöperation of the human will. Those who hold the last mentioned doctrine reject both the others; and those who hold the two former of necessity reject the last.

1888 · Charles Haddon Spurgeon, Spurgeon's Sermons, Volume 34 (1888) 2045

If it is right for Him to purpose to give Grace today, it was right for Him to have purposed it before this date. He is a God that changes not, and what He performs today is not the purpose of today but the purpose of all eternity—"For known unto God are all His works from the beginning of the world." God knows and God appoints those who shall believe and be saved. But please note this fact—God can effect His purpose with man without violating his will.

1907 · Charles Haddon Spurgeon, Spurgeon's Sermons, Volume 53 (1907) 3048

Beloved, do not any of you swerve from the free Grace of God, for the babblings about man's free agency are neither more nor less than lies, right contrary to the Truth of Christ and the teachings of the Spirit. How certain, then, is the salvation of every elect soul! It does not depend on the will of man—he is "made willing" in the day of God's power. He shall be called at the set time and his heart shall be effectually changed, that he may become a trophy of the Redeemer's power.

1932 · Loraine Boettner, The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination 11.4

The Arminian view takes election out of the hands of God and puts it into the hands of man. This makes the purposes of Almighty God to be conditioned by the precarious wills of apostate men and makes temporal events to be the cause of His eternal acts. It means further that He has created a set of sovereign beings upon whom to a certain extent His will and actions are dependent. It represents God as a good old father who endeavors to get his children to do right, but who is usually defeated because of their perverse wills; nay, it represents Him as having evolved a plan which through the ages has been so generally defeated that it has sent innumerably more persons to hell than to heaven.

1265–1273 · Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I, q. 23, a. 8, co.

Wherefore we must say otherwise that in predestination two things are to be considered---namely, the divine ordination; and its effect. As regards the former, in no possible way can predestination be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For it is not due to their prayers that anyone is predestined by God. As regards the latter, predestination is said to be helped by the prayers of the saints, and by other good works; because providence, of which predestination is a part, does not do away with secondary causes but so provides effects, that the order of secondary causes falls also under providence. So, as natural effects are provided by God in such a way that natural causes are directed to bring about those natural effects, without which those effects would not happen; so the salvation of a person is predestined by God in such a way, that whatever helps that person towards salvation falls under the order of predestination; whether it be one's own prayers or those of another; or other good works, and such like, without which one would not attain to salvation. Whence, the predestined must strive after good works and prayer; because through these means predestination is most certainly fulfilled.

1559 · John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion 3.23.6

I, for my part, am willing to admit, that mere prescience lays no necessity on the creatures; though some do not assent to this, but hold that it is itself the cause of things. But Valla, though otherwise not greatly skilled in sacred matters, seems to me to have taken a shrewder and more acute view, when he shows that the dispute is superfluous since life and death are acts of the divine will rather than of prescience. If God merely foresaw human events, and did not also arrange and dispose of them at his pleasure, there might be room for agitating the question, how far his foreknowledge amounts to necessity; but since he foresees the things which are to happen, simply because he has decreed that they are so to happen, it is vain to debate about prescience, while it is clear that all events take place by his sovereign appointment.

1602 · James Arminius, An Examination of the Treatise of William Perkins An Examination of the Treatise of William Perkins Concerning the Order and Mode of

I wish that you would consider, that certainty of an event results properly from the prescience of God, but its necessity results from the omnipotent and irresistible action of God; which may, indeed, be the foundation of the prescience of some events, but not of this event, because He has determined to save believers by grace; that is, by a mild and gentle suasion, convenient or adapted to their free-will, not by an omnipotent action or motion, which would be subject neither to their will, nor to their ability either of resistance or of will. Much less does the damnation of some proceed from an irresistible necessity, imposed by the Deity.

1667 · God the Father, speaking in Paradise Lost, Paradise Lost 3

What pleasure I from such obedience paid, When will and reason (reason also is choice) Useless and vain, of freedom both despoil’d, Made passive both, had serv’d necessity, Not me. They therefore, as to right belong’d, So were created, nor can justly accuse Their Maker, or their making, or their fate, As if predestination over-rul’d Their will dispos’d by absolute decree Or high foreknowledge they themselves decreed Their own revolt, not I; if I foreknew, Foreknowledge had no influence on their fault, Which had no less proved certain unforeknown. So without least impulse or shadow of fate, Or aught by me immutably foreseen, They trespass, authors to themselves in all Both what they judge, and what they choose; for so I form’d them free: and free they must remain, Till they enthrall themselves; I else must change Their nature, and revoke the high decree Unchangeable, eternal, which ordain’d Their freedom: they themselves ordain’d their fall.

1754 · Jonathan Edwards, A Careful and Strict Enquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of the Freedom of Will 2.12

From what has been observed it is evident, that the absolute decrees of God are no more inconsistent with human liberty, on account of any Necessity of the event, which follows from such decrees, than the absolute Foreknowledge of God. Because the connexion between the event and certain Foreknowledge, is as infallible and indissoluble, as between the event and an absolute decree. That is, it is no more impossible, that the event and decree should not agree together, than that the event and absolute Knowledge should disagree. The connexion between the event and Foreknowledge is absolutely perfect, by the supposition: because it is supposed, that the certainty and infallibility of the Knowledge is absolutely perfect. And it being so, the certainty cannot be increased; and therefore the connexion, between the Knowledge and thing known, cannot be increased; so that if a decree be added to the Foreknowledge, it does not at all increase the connexion, or make it more infallible and indissoluble. If it were not so, the certainty of Knowledge might be increased by the addition of a decree; which is contrary to the supposition, which is, that the Knowledge is absolutely perfect, or perfect to the highest possible degree. There is as much impossibility but that the things which are infallibly foreknown, should be, or, which is the same thing, as great a Necessity of their future existence, as if the event were already written down, and was known and read by all mankind, through all preceding ages, and there was the most indissoluble and perfect connexion possible between the writing and the thing written. In such a case, it would be as impossible the event should fail of existence, as if it had existed already; and a decree cannot make an event surer or more necessary than this.

1767 · John Gill, A Body of Doctrinal Divinity Chapter 9. Of The Omniscience Of God

Indeed, with respect to God, there is nothing casual or contingent; nothing comes to pass but what is decreed by him, what he has determined either to do himself, or by others, or suffer to be done, (Lam. 3:37, 38) that which is chance to others is none to him; what more a chance matter than a lot? yet though that is cast into the lap, and it is casual to men, how it will turn up, “the whole disposing of it is of the Lord” (Prov. 16:33). What more contingent than the imaginations, thoughts, and designs of men, what they will be? and yet these are foreknown before conceived in the mind, (Deut. 31:21; Ps. 139:2) or than the voluntary actions of men, yet these are foreknown and foretold by the Lord, long before they are done; as the names of persons given them, and what should be done by them; as of Josiah, that he should offer the priests, and burn the bones of men on the altar at Bethel, (see 1 King 13:2; 2 King 23:15, 16) and of Cyrus, that he should give orders for the building of the temple, and city of Jerusalem; and let the captive Jews go free without price, (Isa. 44:28, 45:13; Ezra 1:1-3) all which were predicted of these persons by name, some hundreds of years before they were born: how all this is reconcileable with the liberty of man’s will, is a difficulty; and therefore objected to the certain foreknowledge and decree of God; but whether this difficulty can be removed, or no, the thing is not less certain: let it be observed, that God’s decrees do not at all infringe the liberty of the will, nor do they put anything in it, nor lay any force upon it; they only imply a necessity of the event, but not of coaction, or force on the will; nor do men feel any such force upon them; they act as freely, and with the full consent of their will, whether good men or bad men, in what they do, as if there were no foreknowledge and determination of them by God; good men willingly do what they do, under the influence of grace, though foreordained to it by the Lord, (Eph. 2:10; Phil. 2:13) and so do wicked men; as Judas in betraying Christ, and the Jews in crucifying him; though both were “according to the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God” (Luke 22:22; Acts 2:23).

1823 · Robert South, Sermons Preached Upon Several Occasions, Volume 5 19

Besides, whensoever God decrees that a thing shall come to pass, he decrees the manner of its production also, and that suitably to the way of working proper to that cause by which it is effected: as if he decrees that a man shall do such or such a thing, he decrees that he shall do it freely, and agreeably to that liberty of will that his nature invests him with.

1949 · Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology 1.2.1

Such certainty is indeed inconsistent with the Pelagian liberty of indifference, according to which the will of man is not determined in any way, but is entirely indeterminate, so that in every volition it can decide in opposition, not only to all outward inducements, but also to all inward considerations and judgments, inclinations and desires, and even to the whole character and inner state of man. But it is now generally recognized that such freedom of the will is a psychological fiction. However, the decree is not necessarily inconsistent with human freedom in the sense of rational self-determination, according to which man freely acts in harmony with his previous thoughts and judgments, his inclinations and desires, and his whole character. This freedom also has its laws, and the better we are acquainted with them, the more sure we can be of what a free agent will do under certain circumstances.

1738–1768 · George Whitefield, Tracts (Works, vol. 4) 5

Dear Sir, for Jesus Christ’s sake, consider how you dishonour God by denying election. You plainly make salvation depend not on God’s free-grace, but on man’s free-will; and if thus, it is more than probable, Jesus Christ would not have had the satisfaction of seeing the fruit of his death in the eternal salvation of one soul. Our preaching would then be vain, and all invitations for people to believe in him, would also be in vain.

1754 · John Wesley, Explanatory Notes on Acts 13.48

Not that God rejected the rest: it was his will that they also should have been saved: but they thrust salvation from them. Nor were they who then believed constrained to believe. But grace was then first copiously offered them. And they did not thrust it away, so that a great multitude even of Gentiles were converted. In a word, the expression properly implies, a present operation of Divine grace working faith in the hearers.

1850 · Henry Edward Manning, Sermons, Volume 4 19

After years well spent in faithful service, when the will and heart are ripened by trial into steadfast faith and love, then, in His mercy, God bestows a crowning gift upon His servants—the grace of perseverance. There is an interior ministry of the Spirit, ever working, sealing by an inward and divine seal the proved servants of Christ: not by a capricious or mechanical predestination, but by an election founded on the moral attributes of God and on the moral nature of man. God made man free, and elects him to and in the exercise of freedom, will, and power.

1856–1869 · J. C. Ryle, Expository Thoughts on the Gospels: Luke 10.21-24

Let us, however, never forget that God's sovereignty does not destroy man's responsibility. That same God who does all things according to the counsel of His own will, always addresses us as accountable creatures, as beings whose blood will be on their own heads if they are lost.

1869 · Charles Haddon Spurgeon, Spurgeon's Sermons, Volume 15 (1869) 886

Now, I believe in predestination, yes, even in its very jots and tittles. I believe that the path of a single grain of dust in the March wind is ordained and settled by a decree which cannot be violated. I believe that every word and thought of man, every flittering of a sparrow's wing, every flight of a fly, the crawling of a beetle, the gliding of a fish in the depth of the sea—that everything, in fact—is foreknown and foreordained. But I do equally believe in the free agency of man, that man acts as he wills, especially in moral operations—choosing the evil with a will that is unbiased by anything that comes from God—biased only by his own depravity of heart and the perverseness of his habits. I believe in man's free agency in choosing the right, too, with perfect freedom—though sacredly guided and led by the Holy Spirit—but in such a way that his disposition is trained to choose and prefer the right and the true, not violently driven in the teeth of his own reluctance.

1878 · Charles G. Finney, Lectures on Systematic Theology 44

Why not also apply this objection to everything, and settle down in despair of ever doing or being anything, but what an irresistible fate makes you? The fact is, that the true doctrine, whether of election or reprobation, affords not the least countenance to such a conclusion. The foreknowledge and designs of God respecting our conduct or our destiny, do not in the least degree interfere with our free agency. We, in every case, act just as freely as if God neither knew nor designed anything about our conduct. Suppose the farmer should make the same objection to sowing his seed, and to doing anything to secure a crop; what would be thought of him? And yet he might with as much reason, since he can plead the foreknowledge and designs of God, as an excuse for doing nothing to secure his salvation. God as really knows now whether you will sow and whether you will have a crop, and has from eternity known this, as perfectly as he ever will. He has either designed that you shall, or that you shall not, have a crop this year, from all eternity; and it will infallibly come to pass just as he has foreseen and designed. Yet you are really just as free to raise a crop, or to neglect to do so, as if he neither knew nor designed anything about it.

1878 · Charles G. Finney, Lectures on Systematic Theology 43

Every sinner under the gospel has it within his power to accept or reject salvation. The elect can know their election only by accepting the offered gift. The non-elect can know their non-election only by the consciousness of a voluntary rejection of offered life. If any one fears that he is one of the non-elect, let him at once renounce his unbelief, and, cease to reject salvation, and the ground of fear and complaint instantly falls away.

1880 · Charles Haddon Spurgeon, Spurgeon's Sermons, Volume 26 (1880) 1566

The purpose embraces the means for the carrying out of the purpose and that decree which predestinates the salvation of many in Corinth predestinates that Paul should go there and that he should stay there a year and a half—and night and day, with tears, should seek the souls of men! What a comfort it ought to be to all earnest workers that God has many people yet unsaved whom He will save and must save! Thus we go to work under the sweet shadow of the Divine decree, stimulated by it to labor with all our might.

1918 · Arthur W. Pink, The Sovereignty of God Chapter 8 - Sovereignty and Human Responsibility

In conclusion it remains to point out that it is the responsibility of every man to use the means which God has placed to his hand. An attitude of fatalistic inertia, because I know that God has irrevocably decreed whatsoever comes to pass, is to make a sinful and hurtful use of what God has revealed for the comfort of my heart. The same God who has decreed that a certain end shall be accomplished has also decreed that that end shall be attained through and as the result of His own appointed means. God does not disdain the use of means, nor must I. For example: God has decreed that "while the earth remaineth, seedtime and harvest... shall not cease" (Gen. 8:22); but that does not mean man's ploughing of the ground and sowing of the seed are needless. No; God moves men to do those very things, blesses their labours, and so fulfils His own ordination. In like manner, God has, from the beginning, chosen a people unto salvation; but that does not mean there is no need for evangelists to preach the Gospel, or for sinners to believe it; it is by such means that His eternal counsels are effectuated.

1930–1933 · A. T. Robertson, Word Pictures in the New Testament: Romans 8.28

Paul accepts fully human free agency but behind it all and through it all runs God's sovereignty as here and on its gracious side (9:11; 3:11; 2Ti 1:9 ).