Pelagianism and the augustinian reply

c. 370–419 · Jerome, Letters 133.5

The better to deceive men they have added to the maxim given above the saving clause “but not without the grace of God;” and this may at the first blush take in some readers. However, when it is carefully sifted and considered, it can deceive nobody. For while they acknowledge the grace of God, they tell us that our acts do not depend upon His help. Rather, they understand by the grace of God free will and the commandments of the Law. They quote Isaiah’s words: “God hath given the law to aid men,” and say that we ought to thank Him for having created us such that of our own free will we can choose the good and avoid the evil. Nor do they see that in alleging this the devil uses their lips to hiss out an intolerable blasphemy. For if God’s grace is limited to this that He has formed us with wills of our own, and if we are to rest content with free will, not seeking the divine aid lest this should be impaired, we should cease to pray; for we cannot entreat God’s mercy to give us daily what is already in our hands having been given to us once for all. Those who think thus make prayer impossible and boast that free will makes them not merely controllers of themselves but as powerful as God.

415 · Jerome, Dialogue Against the Pelagians (Dialogi contra Pelagianos) 1.27

What Christian can bear to hear this? For if not one, nor a few, nor many, but all of us are governed by our own free choice, what becomes of the help of God? And how do you explain the text, “A man’s goings are ordered by the Lord”? And “A man’s way is not in himself”; and “No one can receive anything, unless it be given him from above”; and elsewhere, “What hast thou which thou didst not receive? But if thou didst receive it, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received it?” Our Lord and Saviour says:“I am come down from heaven not to do Mine own will, but the will of the Father who sent Me.” And in another place, “Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from Me; nevertheless not My will, but Thine be done.” And in the Lord’s prayer, “Thy will be done as in heaven, so on earth.” How is it that you are so rash as to do away with all God’s help?

c. 417 · Augustine of Hippo, On the Proceedings of Pelagius (De gestis Pelagii) 10.22

This grace, then, which was most completely known in the catholic Church (as the bishops were well aware), they supposed Pelagius made confession of, when they heard him say that “a man, when converted from his sins, is able by his own exertion and the grace of God to be without sin.” For my own part, however, I remembered the treatise which had been given to me, that I might refute it, by those servants of God, who had been Pelagius’ followers. They, notwithstanding their great affection for him, plainly acknowledged that the passage was his; when, on this question being proposed, because he had already given offence to very many persons from advancing views against the grace of God, he most expressly admitted that “what he meant by God’s grace was that, when our nature was created, it received the capacity of not sinning, because it was created with free will.” On account, therefore, of this treatise, I cannot help feeling still anxious, whilst many of the brethren who are well acquainted with his discussions, share in my anxiety, lest under the ambiguity which notoriously characterizes his words there lies some latent reserve, and lest he should afterwards tell his followers that it was without prejudice to his own doctrine that he made any admissions,—discoursing thus: “I no doubt asserted that a man was able by his own exertion and the grace of God to live without sin; but you know very well what I mean by grace; and you may recollect reading that grace is that in which we are created by God with a free will.” Accordingly, while the bishops understood him to mean the grace by which we have by adoption been made new creatures, not that by which we were created (for most plainly does Holy Scripture instruct us in the former sense of grace as the true one), ignorant of his being a heretic, they acquitted him as a catholic.

c. 417 · Augustine of Hippo, On the Proceedings of Pelagius (De gestis Pelagii) 3.8

This being the case, how must God’s children, who have learned the truth of all this and rejoice at being ruled and led by the Spirit of God, have been affected when they heard or read that Pelagius had declared in writing that “all men are governed by their own will, and that every one is submitted to his own desire?” And yet, when questioned by the bishops, he fully perceived what an evil impression these words of his might produce, and told them in answer that “he had made such an assertion in the interest of free will,”—adding at once, “God is its helper whenever it chooses good; whilst man is himself in fault when he sins, as being under the influence of a free will.” Although the pious judges approved of this sentiment also, they were unwilling to consider or examine how incautiously he had written, or indeed in what sense he had employed the words found in his book. They thought it was enough that he had made such a confession concerning free will, as to admit that God helped the man who chose the good, whereas the man who sinned was himself to blame, his own will sufficing for him in this direction. According to this, God rules those whom He assists in their choice of the good. So far, then, as they rule anything themselves, they rule it rightly, since they themselves are ruled by Him who is right and good.

418 · Augustine of Hippo, On the Grace of Christ, and on Original Sin (De gratia Christi et de peccato originali) 1.3.3

But why should we wonder at this? For the same Pelagius, who in the Proceedings of the episcopal synod unhesitatingly condemned those who say “that God’s grace and assistance are not given for single acts, but consist in free will, or in law and teaching,” upon which points we were apt to think that he had expended all his subterfuges; and who also condemned such as affirm that the grace of God is bestowed in proportion to our merits:—is proved, notwithstanding, to hold, in the books which he has published on the freedom of the will, and which he mentions in the letter he sent to Rome, no other sentiments than those which he seemingly condemned. For that grace and help of God, by which we are assisted in avoiding sin, he places either in nature and free will, or else in the gift of the law and teaching; the result of which of course is this, that whenever God helps a man, He must be supposed to help him to turn away from evil and do good, by revealing to him and teaching him what he ought to do, but not with the additional assistance of His co-operation and inspiration of love, that he may accomplish that which he had discovered it to be his duty to do.

c. 420–421 · Augustine of Hippo, Against Two Letters of the Pelagians (Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum) 2.8.17

I have already shown what empty things they speak about fate and grace. Now the question which I ought to consider is this, whether God inspires the desire of good into unwilling and resisting man, that he may be no longer unwilling, no longer resisting, but consenting to the good and willing the good. For those men will have it that the desire of good in man begins from man himself; that the merit of this beginning is, moreover, attended with the grace of completion—if, at least, they will allow so much as even this. For Pelagius says that what is good is “more easily” fulfilled if grace assists. By which addition—that is, by adding “more easily”—he certainly signifies that he is of the opinion that, even if the aid of grace should be wanting, yet good might be accomplished, although with greater difficulty, by free will.

c. 420–421 · Augustine of Hippo, Against Two Letters of the Pelagians (Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum) 2.2.2

The Manicheans deny that to a good man the beginning of evil came from free will; the Pelagians say that even a bad man has free will sufficiently to perform the good commandment. The catholic Church condemns both, saying to the former, “God made man upright,” and saying to the latter, “If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed.”

1680–1681 · Thomas Manton, Works, vol. VI Several Sermons Upon the CXIX. Psalm, Sermon XL. Incline my heart unto thy testimonies, and not to covetousness

Pelagius at first gave all to nature, acknowledged no necessity of divine grace; but when this proud doctrine found little countenance, he called nature by the name of grace; and when that deceit was discovered, he acknowledged no other grace but outward instruction, or the benefit of external revelation, that a man might by the word of God know and be put in mind of his duty. Being yet driven further, he acknowledged the grace of pardon, and before a man could do anything acceptably there was a necessity of the remission of sin, and then he might obey God perfectly. But that not sufficing, he acknowledged another grace, the example of Christ, which doth both secure our rule and encourage our practice; and so made the grace of Christ consist, not in the secret efficacy of his Spirit, but only in the example of Christ. But being driven further to acknowledge the same internal grace (I mean, his followers), they made it to consist in some illumination of the understanding, or some moral persuasion, by probable argument to excite the will; and this not absolutely necessary, but only for facilitation, as a horse to a journey, which otherwise a man might go on foot. Ay! but ‘the law was impossible through our flesh.’ Rom. viii. 3. But all this is short of that divine grace that is necessary. Now, there are others grant the secret influences of God’s grace, but make the will of man be to a co-ordinate cause with God; namely, that God doth propound the object, hold forth inducing considerations, give some remote power and assistance; but still there is an indifferency in the will of man to accept and refuse as liketh him best. Besides all this, there is a prevailing efficacy, or a real influence from the Spirit of God on the will, whereby it is moved infallibly and certainly to close with those things which God propounds unto him. God worketh efficaciously and determinately, not leaving it to the liberty of man’s will to choose or refuse it, but man is determined, inclined, and actually poised by the grace of God to that which is good.

1866 · Philip Schaff, History of the Christian Church, Vol. 3: Nicene and Post-Nicene Christianity, A.D. 311-600 9.146

The Greek, and particularly the Alexandrian fathers, in opposition to the dualism and fatalism of the Gnostic systems, which made evil a necessity of nature, laid great stress upon human freedom, and upon the indispensable cooperation of this freedom with divine grace; while the Latin fathers, especially Tertullian and Cyprian, Hilary and Ambrose, guided rather by their practical experience than by speculative principles, emphasized the hereditary sin and hereditary guilt of man, and the sovereignty of God’s grace, without, however, denying freedom and individual accountability. The Greek church adhered to her undeveloped synergism, which coordinates the human will and divine grace as factors in the work of conversion; the Latin church, under the influence of Augustine, advanced to the system of a divine monergism, which gives God all the glory, and makes freedom itself a result of grace; while Pelagianism, on the contrary, represented the principle of a human monergism, which ascribes the chief merit of conversion to man, and reduces grace to a mere external auxiliary.

c. 415–416 · Augustine of Hippo, On Man's Perfection in Righteousness (De perfectione iustitiae hominis) 18.40

Now with all their efforts of disguise they here betray their purpose; for they plainly attempt to controvert the grace and mercy of God, which we desire to obtain whenever we offer the prayer, “Thy will be done in earth as it is in heaven;” or again this, “Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil.” For indeed why do we present such petitions in earnest supplication, if the result is of him that willeth, and him that runneth, but not of God that showeth mercy? Not that the result is without our will, but that our will does not accomplish the result, unless it receive the divine assistance.

418 · Augustine of Hippo, On the Grace of Christ, and on Original Sin (De gratia Christi et de peccato originali) 1.47.52

Inasmuch, however, as the discussion about free will and God’s grace has such difficulty in its distinctions, that when free will is maintained, God’s grace is apparently denied; whilst when God’s grace is asserted, free will is supposed to be done away with,—Pelagius can so involve himself in the shades of this obscurity as to profess agreement with all that we have quoted from St. Ambrose, and declare that such is, and always has been, his opinion also; and endeavour so to explain each, that men may suppose his opinion, to be in fair accord with Ambrose’s. So far therefore, as concerns the questions of God’s help and grace, you are requested to observe the three things which he has distinguished so very plainly, under the terms “ability,” “will,” and “actuality,” that is, “capacity,” “volition,” and “action.” If, then, he has come round to an agreement with us, then not the “capacity” alone in man, even if he neither wills nor performs the good, but the volition and the action also,—in other words, our willing well and doing well,—things which have no existence in man, except when he has a good will and acts rightly:—if, I repeat, he thus consents to hold with us that even the volition and the action are assisted by God, and so assisted that we can neither will nor do any good thing without such help; if, too, he believes that this is that very grace of God through our Lord Jesus Christ which makes us righteous through His righteousness, and not our own, so that our true righteousness is that which we have of Him,—then, so far as I can judge, there will remain no further controversy between us concerning the assistance we have from the grace of God.

418 · Augustine of Hippo, On the Grace of Christ, and on Original Sin (De gratia Christi et de peccato originali) 1.25.26

How can Pelagius say, “That we are able to make a good use of speech comes from God; but that we do actually make this good use of speech proceeds from ourselves,” when the Lord declares, “It is the Spirit of your Father which speaketh in you”? He does not say, “It is not you who have given to yourselves the power of speaking well;” but His words are, “It is not ye that speak.” Nor does He say, “It is the Spirit of your Father which giveth, or hath given, you the power to speak well;” but He says, “which speaketh in you.”

c. 420–421 · Augustine of Hippo, Against Two Letters of the Pelagians (Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum) 1.2.5

But who of us will say that by the sin of the first man free will perished from the human race? Through sin freedom indeed perished, but it was that freedom which was in Paradise, to have a full righteousness with immortality; and it is on this account that human nature needs divine grace, since the Lord says, “If the Son shall make you free, then shall ye be free indeed”—free of course to live well and righteously. For free will in the sinner up to this extent did not perish,—that by it all sin, especially they who sin with delight and with love of sin; what they are pleased to do gives them pleasure. Whence also the apostle says, “When ye were the servants of sin, ye were free from righteousness.” Behold, they are shown to have been by no means able to serve sin except by another freedom. They are not, then, free from righteousness except by the choice of the will, but they do not become free from sin save by the grace of the Saviour.

c. 420–421 · Augustine of Hippo, Against Two Letters of the Pelagians (Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum) 4.6.13

What does it profit them, that in the praise of that same free will “they say that grace assists the good purpose of every one”? This would be received without scruple as being said in a catholic spirit, if they did not attribute merit to the good purpose, to which merit now a wage is paid of debt, not according to grace, but would understand and confess that even that very good purpose, which the grace which follows assists could not have been in the man if grace had not preceded it. For how is there a good purpose in a man without the mercy of God first, since it is that very good will which is prepared by the Lord? But when they had said this, “that grace also assists every one’s good purpose,” and presently added, “yet does not infuse the love of virtue into a resisting heart,” it might be fitly understood, if it were not said by those whose meaning is known. For, for the resisting heart a hearing for the divine call is first procured by the grace of God itself, and then in that heart, now no more resisting, the desire of virtue is kindled. Nevertheless, in all things which any one does according to God, His mercy precedes him. And this they will not have, because they choose to be not catholics, but Pelagians. For it much delights a proud impiety, that even that which a man is forced to confess to be given by the Lord should seem to be not bestowed on himself, but repaid; so that, to wit, the children of perdition, not of the promise, may be thought themselves to have made themselves good, and God to have repaid to those who are now good, having been made so by themselves, the reward due for that their work.

c. 420–421 · Augustine of Hippo, Against Two Letters of the Pelagians (Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum) 1.18.36

To this I answer, that men, in so far as they are men, are the work of God; but in so far as they are sinners, they are under the devil, unless they are plucked from thence by Him who became the Mediator between God and man, for no other reason than because He could not be a sinner from men. And that no one is forced by God’s power unwillingly either into evil or good, but that when God forsakes a man, he deservedly goes to evil, and that when God assists, without deserving he is converted to good. For a man is not good if he is unwilling, but by the grace of God he is even assisted to the point of being willing; because it is not vainly written, “For it is God that worketh in you, both to will and to do for His good pleasure,” and, “The will is prepared by God.”

426–427 · Augustine of Hippo, On Rebuke and Grace (De correptione et gratia) 11.32

Because by this grace of God there is caused in us, in the reception of good and in the persevering hold of it, not only to be able to do what we will, but even to will to do what we are able. But this was not the case in the first man; for the one of these things was in him, but the other was not. For he did not need grace to receive good, because he had not yet lost it; but he needed the aid of grace to continue in it, and without this aid he could not do this at all; and he had received the ability if he would, but he had not the will for what he could; for if he had possessed it, he would have persevered. For he could persevere if he would; but that he would not was the result of free will, which at that time was in such wise free that he was capable of willing well and ill. For what shall be more free than free will, when it shall not be able to serve sin? and this should be to man also as it was made to the holy angels, the reward of deserving. But now that good deserving has been lost by sin, in those who are delivered that has become the gift of grace which would have been the reward of deserving.

426–427 · Augustine of Hippo, On Grace and Free Will (De gratia et libero arbitrio) 5.10

For it happened that among the objections which were brought up against him, this in particular was objected, that he maintained that the grace of God was given according to our merits,—an opinion which was so diverse from catholic doctrine, and so hostile to the grace of Christ, that unless he had anathematized it, as laid to his charge, he himself must have been anathematized on its account. He pronounced, indeed, the required anathema upon the dogma, but how insincerely his later books plainly show; for in them he maintains absolutely no other opinion than that the grace of God is given according to our merits. Such passages do they collect out of the Scriptures,—like the one which I just now quoted, “Turn ye unto me, and I will turn unto you,”—as if it were owing to the merit of our turning to God that His grace were given us, wherein He Himself even turns unto us. Now the persons who hold this opinion fail to observe that, unless our turning to God were itself God’s gift, it would not be said to Him in prayer, “Turn us again, O God of hosts;” and, “Thou, O God, wilt turn and quicken us;” and again, “Turn us, O God of our salvation,”—with other passages of similar import, too numerous to mention here. For, with respect to our coming unto Christ, what else does it mean than our being turned to Him by believing?

428–429 · Augustine of Hippo, On the Gift of Perseverance (De dono perseverantiae) 16.41

Further, those on whose account I am discoursing are only removed from the heretical perversity of the Pelagians, inasmuch as, although they will not confess that they who by God’s grace are made obedient and so abide, are predestinated, they still confess, nevertheless, that this grace precedes their will to whom it is given; in such a way certainly as that grace may not be thought to be given freely, as the truth declares, but rather according to the merits of a preceding will, as the Pelagian error says, in contradiction to the truth. Therefore, also, grace precedes faith; otherwise, if faith precedes grace, beyond a doubt will also precedes it, because there cannot be faith without will. But if grace precedes faith because it precedes will, certainly it precedes all obedience; it also precedes love, by which alone God is truly and pleasantly obeyed.

428–429 · Augustine of Hippo, On the Predestination of the Saints (De praedestinatione sanctorum) 2.6

Further, if God works our faith, acting in a wonderful manner in our hearts so that we believe, is there any reason to fear that He cannot do the whole; and does man on that account arrogate to himself its first elements, that he may merit to receive its last from God? Consider if in such a way any other result be gained than that the grace of God is given in some way or other, according to our merit, and so grace is no more grace. For on this principle it is rendered as debt, it is not given gratuitously; for it is due to the believer that his faith itself should be increased by the Lord, and that the increased faith should be the wages of the faith begun; nor is it observed when this is said, that this wage is assigned to believers, not of grace, but of debt. And I do not at all see why the whole should not be attributed to man,—as he who could originate for himself what he had not previously, can himself increase what he had originated,—except that it is impossible to withstand the most manifest divine testimony by which faith, whence piety takes its beginning, is shown also to be the gift of God: such as is that testimony that “God hath dealt to every man the measure of faith;” and that one, “Peace be to the brethren, and love with faith, from God the Father, and the Lord Jesus Christ,” and other similar passages. Man, therefore, unwilling to resist such clear testimonies as these, and yet desiring himself to have the merit of believing, compounds as it were with God to claim a portion of faith for himself, and to leave a portion for Him; and, what is still more arrogant, he takes the first portion for himself and gives the subsequent to Him; and so in that which he says belongs to both, he makes himself the first, and God the second!

c. 442–461 · Leo the Great, Letters 1.3

And when they pretend to disapprove of and give up all their definitions to facilitate evasion through their complete art of deception, unless their meaning is detected, they make exception of the dogma that the grace of God is given according to the merits of the recipient. And yet surely, unless it is given freely, it is not a gift, but a price and compensation for merits: for the blessed Apostle says, “by grace ye have been saved through faith, and that not of yourselves but it is the gift of God; not of works lest any should perchance be exalted. For we are His workmanship created in Christ Jesus in good works, which God prepared that we should walk in them.” Thus every bestowal of good works is of God’s preparing: because a man is justified by grace rather than by his own excellence: for grace is to every one the source of righteousness, the source of good and the fountain of merit.

1619 · Synod of Dort, The Canons of Dort 3-4.err.7

Who teach that the grace by which we are converted to God is nothing but a gentle persuasion, or (as others explain it) that the way of God’s acting in man’s conversion that is most noble and suited to human nature is that which happens by persuasion, and that nothing prevents this grace of moral suasion even by itself from making natural men spiritual; indeed, that God does not produce the assent of the will except in this manner of moral suasion, and that the effectiveness of God’s work by which it surpasses the work of Satan consists in the fact that God promises eternal benefits while Satan promises temporal ones. For this teaching is entirely Pelagian and contrary to the whole of Scripture, which recognizes besides this persuasion also another, far more effective and divine way in which the Holy Spirit acts in man’s conversion. As Ezekiel 36:26 puts it: “I will give you a new heart and put a new spirit in you; and I will remove your heart of stone and give you a heart of flesh.…”

1871 · Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, vol. 2 (Part II, Anthropology; Part III, Soteriology, chapters I-XIV) 2.8.4

We recognize the obligation to be free from all sin, and absolutely conformed to the perfect law of God. Yet no man is so infatuated or so blinded to his real character as really to believe that he either is thus perfect, or has the power to make himself so. It is the daily and hourly prayer or aspiration of every saint and of every sinner to be delivered from the bondage of evil. The proud and malignant would gladly be humble and benevolent; the covetous would rejoice to be liberal; the infidel longs for faith, and the hardened sinner for repentance. Sin is in its own nature a burden and a torment, and although loved and cherished, as the cups of the drunkard are cherished, yet, if emancipation could be effected by an act of the will, sin would cease to reign in any rational creature. There is no truth, therefore, of which men are more intimately convinced than that they are the slaves of sin; that they cannot do the good they would; and that they cannot alter their character at will. There is no principle, therefore, more at variance with the common consciousness of men than the fundamental principle of Pelagianism that our ability limits our obligation, that we are not bound to be better than we can make ourselves by a volition.

1949 · Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology 4.5

Pelagius sought the explanation for this in the arbitrary will of man. Man has by nature a perfectly free will, so that he can accept or reject the gospel, as he sees fit, and thus either obtain or fail to obtain the blessings of salvation. Augustine, on the other hand, ascribed the difference to the operation of the grace of God. Said he: "The hearing of the divine call, is produced by divine grace itself, in him who before resisted; and then the love of virtue is kindled in him when he no longer resists." Semi-Pelagianism sought to mediate between the two and to avoid both the Augustinian denial of free will and the Pelagian depreciation of divine grace. It assumed the presence of the seeds of virtue in man, which of themselves tended to bear good fruit, but held that these needed the fructifying influence of divine grace for their development. The grace necessary for this is given to all men gratuitously, so that they are with the aid of it able to accept the gospel call unto salvation.

c. 426–429 · John Cassian, Conferences (Conlationes) 13.18

And from this it is clearly gathered by those who, led not by chattering words but by experience, measure the magnitude of grace, and the paltry limits of man’s will, that “the race is not to the swift nor the battle to the strong, nor food to the wise, nor riches to the prudent, nor grace to the learned,” but that “all these worketh that one and the selfsame Spirit, dividing to every man severally as He will.” And therefore it is proved by no doubtful faith but by experience which can (so to speak) be laid hold of, that God the Father of all things worketh indifferently all things in all, as the Apostle says, like some most kind father and most benign physician; and that now He puts into us the very beginnings of salvation, and gives to each the zeal of his free will; and now grants the carrying out of the work, and the perfecting of goodness; and now saves men, even against their will and without their knowledge, from ruin that is close at hand, and a headlong fall; and now affords them occasions and opportunities of salvation, and wards off headlong and violent attacks from purposes that would bring death; and assists some who are already willing and running, while He draws others who are unwilling and resisting, and forces them to a good will.

c. 426–429 · John Cassian, Conferences (Conlationes) 13.10

For Holy Scripture supports the freedom of the will where it says: “Keep thy heart with all diligence,” but the Apostle indicates its weakness by saying “The Lord keep your hearts and minds in Christ Jesus.” David asserts the power of free will, where he says “I have inclined my heart to do Thy righteous acts,” but the same man in like manner teaches us its weakness, by praying and saying, “Incline my heart unto Thy testimonies and not to covetousness:” Solomon also: “The Lord incline our hearts unto Himself that we may walk in all His ways and keep His commandments, and ordinances and judgments.” The Psalmist denotes the power of our will, where he says: “Keep thy tongue from evil, and thy lips that they speak no guile,” our prayer testifies to its weakness, when we say: “O Lord, set a watch before my mouth, and keep the door of my lips.” The importance of our will is maintained by the Lord, when we find “Break the chains of thy neck, O captive daughter of Zion:” of its weakness the prophet sings, when he says: “The Lord looseth them that are bound:” and “Thou hast broken my chains: To Thee will I offer the sacrifice of praise.” We hear in the gospel the Lord summoning us to come speedily to Him by our free will: “Come unto Me all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will refresh you,” but the same Lord testifies to its weakness, by saying: “No man can come unto Me except the Father which sent Me draw him.” The Apostle indicates our free will by saying: “So run that ye may obtain:” but to its weakness John Baptist bears witness where he says: “No man can receive anything of himself, except it be given him from above.” We are commanded to keep our souls with all care, when the Prophet says: “Keep your souls,” but by the same spirit another Prophet proclaims: “Except the Lord keep the city, the watchman waketh but in vain.” The Apostle writing to the Philippians, to show that their will is free, says “Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling,” but to point out its weakness, he adds: “For it is God that worketh in you both to will and to do of His good pleasure.”

c. 426–429 · John Cassian, Conferences (Conlationes) 13.12

It cannot then be doubted that there are by nature some seeds of goodness in every soul implanted by the kindness of the Creator: but unless these are quickened by the assistance of God, they will not be able to attain to an increase of perfection, for, as the blessed Apostle says: “Neither is he that planteth anything nor he that watereth, but God that giveth the increase.” But that freedom of the will is to some degree in a man’s own power is very clearly taught in the book termed the Pastor, where two angels are said to be attached to each one of us, i.e., a good and a bad one, while it lies at a man’s own option to choose which to follow. And therefore the will always remains free in man, and can either neglect or delight in the grace of God. For the Apostle would not have commanded saying: “Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling,” had he not known that it could be advanced or neglected by us. But that men might not fancy that they had no need of Divine aid for the work of Salvation, he subjoins: “For it is God that worketh in you both to will and to do, of His good pleasure.”

1871 · Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, vol. 2 (Part II, Anthropology; Part III, Soteriology, chapters I-XIV) 3.14.7

To avoid the dreaded conclusion that fallen men lie at the mercy of God, and that He has mercy on whom He will have mercy, the Semi-Pelagians denied that the grace of God was irresistible. If not irresistible, then it depends on the sinner whether it be yielded to or rejected. But this yielding to the grace of God, is something right and good, and something leading to salvation. Fallen men therefore are not utterly disabled to all good. And if not thus powerless for spiritual good, they are not spiritually dead. Original sin consequently, is not so dreadful an evil as Augustine represented it. Men are weak and sick; but not helpless and dead. The Semi-Pelagians, as the designation implies, therefore, endeavoured to hold a middle ground between Augustine and Pelagius.

1871 · Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, vol. 2 (Part II, Anthropology; Part III, Soteriology, chapters I-XIV) 3.14.7

On some of these points the original leaders of the Semi-Pelagian party differed among themselves, but this is a correct exhibition of the system as known in history as a form of doctrine. The characteristic principle of the Semi-Pelagian theory, by which it is distinguished from the doctrine afterwards adopted in the Romish Church, and by the Remonstrants and others, is that the sinner begins the work of conversion. The Semi-Pelagians denied “preventing grace.”

1949 · Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology 2.2.4

Semi-Pelagianism reacted against the absoluteness of the Augustinian view. It admitted that the whole human race is involved in the fall of Adam, that human nature is tainted with hereditary sin, and that all men are by nature inclined to evil and not able, apart from the grace of God, to complete any good work; but denied the total depravity of man, the guilt of original sin, and the loss of the freedom of the will.