Luther's bondage of the will

1871 · Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, vol. 2 (Part II, Anthropology; Part III, Soteriology, chapters I-XIV) 2.9.2

The controversy between Luther and Erasmus was really about ability, nominally it was about free-will. Luther’s book is entitled “De Servo Arbitrio,” that of Erasmus, “De Libero Arbitrio.” This usage pervades all the symbols of the Reformation, and was followed by the theologians of the sixteenth century.

1879 · Charles Haddon Spurgeon, Spurgeon's Sermons, Volume 25 (1879) 1473

In truth, the will has a wonderful power over all the faculties and rules them like a despot. It is boasted that the will of man is free, yet Luther was quite correct when he called it a slave! Never is it so much a slave as when it brags of its own liberty! Let the Spirit of God come into the heart and apply with power the Gospel of Jesus Christ—and the human will no longer glories in its freedom, but surrenders and is subjugated!

1888 · Philip Schaff, History of the Christian Church, Vol. 7: Modern Christianity, The German Reformation 4.73

He waited a whole year before he published his reply on the "Slavery of the Will" (December, 1525). It is one of his most vigorous and profound books, full of grand ideas and shocking exaggerations, that border on Manichaeism and fatalism. He thanked Erasmus for going to the root of the controversy instead of troubling him "about the papacy, purgatory, indulgences, and other fooleries." He inseparably connects divine foreknowledge and foreordination, and infers from God’s almighty power that all things happen by necessity, and that there can be no freedom in the creature. He represents the human will as a horse or a donkey which goes just as the rider directs it; and that rider is the Devil in the state of fallen nature, and God in the state of grace. The will has no choice of master; it is God and the Devil who are fighting for its possession. The Scripture exhortations to repentance and holy living must not be understood seriously, but ironically, as if God would say to man: Only try to repent and to do good, and you will soon find out that you cannot do it.

1525 · Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will (De Servo Arbitrio) 157

John and Paul here saith, that grace is not only not received for any devoted effort of our own, but even for the grace of another, or the merit of another, that is “of one Man Jesus Christ.” Therefore, it is either false, that we receive our grace for the grace of another, or else it is evident, that “Free-will” is nothing at all; for both cannot consist — that the grace of God, is both so cheap, that it may be obtained in common and every where by the ‘little endeavour’ of any man; and at the same time so dear, that it is given unto us only in and through the grace of one Man, and He so great! And I would also, that the advocates for “Free-will” be admonished in this place, that when they assert “Free-will,” they are deniers of Christ. For if I obtain grace by my own endeavours, what need have I of the grace of Christ for the receiving of my grace?

1525 · Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will (De Servo Arbitrio) 26

And who does not know, that this is not in trees or beasts? For, (as they say) Heaven was not made for geese. Therefore, it stands confirmed, even by your own testimony, that we do all things from necessity, not from “Free-will:” seeing that, the power of “Free-will” is nothing, and neither does, nor can do good, without grace. Unless you wish efficacy to bear a new signification, and to be understood as meaning perfection: that is, that “Free-will” can, indeed, will and begin, but cannot perfect: which I do not believe: and upon this I shall speak more at large hereafter. It now then follows, that Free-will is plainly a divine term, and can be applicable to none but the divine Majesty only: for He alone “doth, (as the Psalm sings) what He will in Heaven and earth.”

1525 · Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will (De Servo Arbitrio) 44

For what is there that can be any where beneath, above, within, and without the word and work of God, but God Himself? And what is there here left to grace and the Holy Spirit? This is plainly to ascribe divinity to “Free-will.” For to will to embrace the Law and the Gospel, not to will sin, and to will death, belongs to the power of God alone: as Paul testifies in more places than one. Wherefore, no one, since the Pelagians, has written more rightly concerning “Free-will” than Erasmus. For I have said above, that “Free-will” is a divine term, and signifies a divine power. But no one hitherto, except the Pelagians, has ever assigned to it that power. Hence, Erasmus by far outstrips the Pelagians themselves: for they assign that divinity to the whole of “Free-will,” but Erasmus to the half of it only. They divide “Free-will” into two parts; the power of discerning, and the power of choosing; assigning the one to reason, and the other to will; and the Sophists do the same. But Erasmus, setting aside the power of discerning, exalts the power of choosing alone, and thus makes a lame, half-membered “Free-will,” God himself!

1525 · Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will (De Servo Arbitrio) 159

Take it therefore which way you will. — If you grant that the Scriptures speak in positive assertion, you can say nothing for “Free-will,” but that which is contrary to Christ: that is, you will say, that error, death, Satan, and all evils, reign in Him. If you do not grant that they speak in positive assertion, you weaken the Scriptures, make them to establish nothing, not even to prove that Christ is necessary. And thus, while you establish “Free-will,” you make Christ void, and bring the whole Scripture to destruction. And though you may pretend, verbally, that you confess Christ; yet, in reality and in heart, you deny Him. For if the power of “Free-will” be not a thing erroneous altogether, and damnable, but sees and wills those things which are good and meritorious, and which pertain unto salvation, it is whole, it wants not the physician Christ, nor does Christ redeem that part of man. — For what need is there for light and life, where there is light and life already? Moreover, if that power be not redeemed, the best part in man is not redeemed, but is of itself good and whole. And then also, God is unjust if He damn any man; because, He damns that which is the most excellent in man, and whole; that is, He damns him when innocent.

1525 · Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will (De Servo Arbitrio) 44

But, not contented with this, he outstrips even the philosophers. For it has never yet been settled among them, whether or not any thing can give motion to itself; and upon this point, the Platonics and Peripatetics are divided in the whole body of philosophy. But according to Erasmus, “Freewill” not only of its own power gives motion to itself, but ‘applies itself’ to those things which are eternal; that is, which are incomprehensible to itself! A new and unheard-of definer of “Freewill,” truly, who leaves the philosophers, the Pelagians, the Sophists, and all the rest of them, far behind him! Nor is this all. He does not even spare himself, but dissents from, and militates against himself, more than against all the rest together. For he had said before, that ‘the human will is utterly ineffective without grace:’ (unless perhaps this was said only in joke!) but here, where he gives a serious definition, he says, that ‘the human will has that power by which it can effectively apply itself to those things which pertain unto eternal salvation;’ that is, which are incomparably beyond that power. So that, in this part, Erasmus outstrips even himself!

1525 · Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will (De Servo Arbitrio) 160

Hence, where the Scripture so often saith, “All men are liars,” we must, upon the authority of “Free-will,” on the contrary say — the Scripture rather, lies; because, man is not a liar as to his best part, that is, his reason and will, but as to his flesh only, that is, his blood and his grosser part: so that that whole, according to which he is called man, that is, his reason and his will, is sound and holy. Again, there is that of the Baptist, “He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life; he that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him.” (John iii. 36). We must understand “upon him” thus: — that is, the wrath of God abideth upon the ‘grosser affections’ of the man: but upon that power of “Free-will,” that is, upon his will and his reason, abide grace and everlasting life. Hence, according to this, in order that “Free-will” might stand, whatever is in the Scriptures said against the ungodly, you are, by the figure synecdoche, to twist round to apply to that brutal part of man, that the truly rational and human part might remain safe. I have therefore, to render thanks to the assertors of “Free-will;” because, I may sin with all confidence; knowing that, my reason and will, or my “Free-will,” cannot be damned, because it cannot be destroyed by my sinning, but for ever remains sound, righteous, and holy. And thus, happy in my will and reason, I shall rejoice that my filthy and brutal flesh is distinctly separated from me, and damned; so far shall I be from wishing Christ to become its Redeemer! — You see, here, to what the doctrine of “Free-will” brings us — it denies all things, divine and human, temporal and eternal; and with all these enormities, makes a laughing-stock of itself!

1525 · Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will (De Servo Arbitrio) 45

The opinion of the Sophists, or at least of the father of them, Peter Lombard, is far more tolerable: he says, ‘“Free-will” is the faculty of discerning, and then choosing also good, if with grace, but evil if grace be wanting.’ He plainly agrees in sentiment with Augustine, that ‘“Freewill,” of its own power, cannot do any thing but fall, nor avail unto any thing but to sin.’ Wherefore Augustine also, Book ii., against Julian, calls “Free-will” ‘under bondage,’ rather than ‘free.’ — But you make the power of “Free-will” equal in both respects: that it can, by its own power, without grace, both apply itself unto good, and turn itself from evil. For you do not imagine how much you assign unto it, by this pronoun itself, and by itself, when you say ‘can apply itself:’ for you utterly exclude the Holy Spirit with all His power, as a thing superfluous and unnecessary. Your definition, therefore, is condemnable even by the Sophists; who, were they not so blinded by hatred and fury against me, would be enraged at your book rather than at mine.

1525 · Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will (De Servo Arbitrio) 41

The thing defined itself, if it be closely examined, has a much wider extent than the definition of it: and such a definition, the Sophists would call faulty: that is, when the definition does not fully embrace the thing defined. For I have shown before, that “Free-will” cannot be applied to any one but to God only. You may, perhaps, rightly assign to man some kind of will, but to assign unto him “Free-will” in divine things, is going too far. For the term “Free-will,” in the judgment of the ears of all, means, that which can, and does do God-ward, whatever it pleases, restrainable by no law and no command. But you cannot call him Free, who is a servant acting under the power of the Lord. How much less, then, can we rightly call men or angels free, who so live under the all-overruling command of God, (to say nothing of sin and death,) that they cannot consist one moment by their own power. Here then, at the outset, the definition of the term, and the definition of the thing termed, militate against each other: because the term signifies one thing, and the thing termed is, by experience, found to be another. It would indeed be more properly termed “Vertible-will,” or “Mutable-will.”

1525 · Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will (De Servo Arbitrio) 45

But now, let us suppose that a Sophist of no mean rank were brought before me, with whom I could speak upon these things apart, in familiar conversation, and should ask him for his liberal and candid judgment in this way: — ‘If any one should tell you, that that was free, which of its own power could only go one way, that is, the bad way, and which could go the other way indeed, that is, the right way, but not by its own power, nay, only by the help of another — could you refrain from laughing in his face, my friend?’ — For in this way, I will make it appear, that a stone, or a log of wood has “Freewill,” because it can go upwards and downwards; although, by its own power, it can go only downwards, but can go upwards only by the help of another. And, as I said before, by meaning at the same time the thing itself, and also something else which may be joined with it or added to it, I will say, consistently with the use of all words and languages — all men are no man, and all things are nothing! Thus, by a multiplicity of argumentation, they at last make “Free-will,” free by accident; as being that, which may at some time be set free by another. But our point in dispute is concerning the thing itself, concerning the reality of “Free-will.” If this be what is to be solved, there now remains nothing, let them say what they will, but the empty name of “Free-will.”

1767 · John Gill, A Body of Doctrinal Divinity Chapter 13. Of Conversion

Nor is conversion owing to the will of men; the will of man, before conversion, is in a bad state, it chooses its own ways, and delights in its abominations; it is in high pursuit after the desires of the flesh and of the mind; it is resolved to go after its lovers, its lusts, which feed its appetite, and furnish with things agreeable to the carnal mind; the will is become a slave to carnal lusts and pleasures; though the natural liberty of the will is not lost by sin, it can freely will natural things, as to eat or drink, sit, or stand, or walk, at pleasure; yet its moral liberty is lost, it is shackled with the fetters of sinful lusts, by which it is overcome and brought into bondage; and notwithstanding its boasted liberty, it is an home born slave; and therefore Luther rightly called it “servum arbitrium”: man has no will to that which is good till God works it in him, and of unwilling makes him willing in the day of his power: he has no will to come to Christ, to be saved by him; nor to submit to his righteousness; nor to be subject to his laws and ordinances, until such a will is worked in him by efficacious grace. Conversion is denied to be of the will of men; as the whole of salvation is “not of him that willeth”; so this part of it in particular, regeneration, with which conversion, in the first moment of it, agrees; “is not of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God” (Rom. 9:16; John 1:13).

1525 · Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will (De Servo Arbitrio) 48

You grant, that man, without special grace, cannot will good: (for we are not now discussing what the grace of God can do, but what man can do without grace:) you grant, then, that “Free-will” cannot will good. This is nothing else but granting that it cannot ‘apply itself to those things which pertain unto eternal salvation,’ according to the tune of your definition. Nay, you say a little before, ‘that the human will after sin, is so depraved, that having lost its liberty, it is compelled to serve sin, and cannot recall itself into a better state.’ And if I am not mistaken, you make the Pelagians to be of this opinion. Now then I believe, my Proteus has here no way of escape: he is caught and held fast in plain words: — ‘that the will, having lost its liberty, is tied and bound a slave to sin.’ O noble Free-will! which, having lost its liberty, is declared by Erasmus himself, to be the slave of sin! When Luther asserted this, ‘nothing was ever heard of so absurd;’ ‘nothing was more useless than that this paradox should be proclaimed abroad!’ So much so, that even a Diatribe must be written against him!

1525 · Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will (De Servo Arbitrio) 94

And even natural Reason herself, who is so offended at this necessity, and who invents so many contrivances to take it out of the way, is compelled to grant it upon her own conviction from her own judgment, even though there were no Scripture at all. For all men find these sentiments written in their hearts, and they acknowledge and approve them (though against their will) whenever they hear them treated on. — First, that God is Omnipotent, not only in power but in action (as I said before): and that, if it were not so, He would be a ridiculous God. — And next, that He knows and foreknows all things, and neither can err nor be deceived. These two points then being granted by the hearts and minds of all, they are at once compelled, from an inevitable consequence, to admit, — that we are not made from our own will, but from necessity: and moreover, that we do not what we will according to the law of “Free-will,” but as God foreknew and proceeds in action, according to His infallible and immutable counsel and power. Wherefore, it is found written alike in the hearts of all men, that there is no such thing as “Free-will”; though that writing be obscured by so many contending disputations, and by the great authority of so many men who have, through so many ages, taught otherwise. Even as every other law also, which, according to the testimony of Paul, is written in our hearts, is then acknowledged when it is rightly set forth, and then obscured, when it is confused by wicked teachers, and drawn aside by other opinions.

1525 · Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will (De Servo Arbitrio) 7

He that does not feel this, let him confess that he is no Christian. And he that despises and laughs at it, let him know that he is the Christian’s greatest enemy. For, if I know not how much I can do myself, how far my ability extends, and what I can do God-wards; I shall be equally uncertain and ignorant how much God is to do, how far His ability is to extend, and what He is to do toward me: whereas it is “God that worketh all in all.” (1 Cor. xii. 6.) But if I know not the distinction between our working and the power of God, I know not God Himself. And if I know not God, I cannot worship Him, praise Him, give Him thanks, nor serve Him; for I shall not know how much I ought to ascribe unto myself, and how much unto God. It is necessary, therefore, to hold the most certain distinction, between the power of God and our power, the working of God and our working, if we would live in His fear.

1525 · Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will (De Servo Arbitrio) 25

Thus the human will is, as it were, a beast between the two. If God sit thereon, it wills and goes where God will: as the Psalm saith, “I am become as it were a beast before thee, and I am continually with thee.” (Ps. lxxiii. 22-23.) If Satan sit thereon, it wills and goes as Satan will.

1525 · Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will (De Servo Arbitrio) 10

I COULD wish, indeed, that we were furnished with some better term for this discussion, than this commonly used term, necessity, which cannot rightly be used, either with reference to the human will, or the divine. It is of a signification too harsh and ill-suited for this subject, forcing upon the mind an idea of compulsion, and that which is altogether contrary to will; whereas, the subject which we are discussing, does not require such an idea: for Will, whether divine or human, does what it does, be it good or evil, not by any compulsion but by mere willingness or desire, as it were, totally free. The will of God, nevertheless, which rules over our mutable will, is immutable and infallible; as Boëtius sings, “Immovable Thyself, Thou movement giv’st to all.” And our own will, especially our corrupt will, cannot of itself do good; therefore, where the term fails to express the idea required, the understanding of the reader must make up the deficiency, knowing what is wished to be expressed — the immutable will of God, and the impotency of our depraved will; or, as some have expressed it, the necessity of immutability, though neither is that sufficiently grammatical, or sufficiently theological.

1525 · Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will (De Servo Arbitrio) 93

Whereas, we are no where more irreverent and rash, than in trespassing and arguing upon these very inscrutable mysteries and judgments. And while we are pretending to a great reverence in searching the Holy Scriptures, those which God has commanded to be searched, we search not; but those which He has forbidden us to search into, those we search into and none other; and that with an unceasing temerity, not to say, blasphemy. For is it not searching with temerity, when we attempt to make the all-free prescience of God to harmonize with our freedom, prepared to derogate prescience from God, rather than lose our own liberty? Is it not temerity, when He imposes necessity upon us, to say, with murmurings and blasphemies, “Why doth He yet find fault? for who hath resisted His will?” (Rom. ix. 19).

1525 · Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will (De Servo Arbitrio) 84

First, then, both Reason and the Diatribe grant, that God works all in all; and that, without Him, nothing is either done or effective, because He is Omnipotent; and because, therefore, all things come under His Omnipotence, as Paul saith to the Ephesians. Now then, Satan and man being fallen and left of God, cannot will good; that is, those things which please God, or which God wills; but are ever turned the way of their own desires, so that they cannot but seek their own. This, therefore, their will and nature, so turned from God, cannot be a nothing: nor are Satan and the wicked man a nothing: nor are the nature and the will which they have a nothing, although it be a nature corrupt and averse. That remnant of nature, therefore, in Satan and the wicked man, of which we speak, as being the creature and work of God, is not less subject to the divine omnipotence and action, than all the rest of the creatures and works of God. Since, therefore, God moves and does all in all, He necessarily moves and does all in Satan and the wicked man. But He so does all in them, as they themselves are, and as He finds them: that is, as they are themselves averse and evil, being carried along by that motion of the Divine Omnipotence, they cannot but do what is averse and evil. Just as it is with a man driving a horse lame on one foot, or lame on two feet; he drives him just so as the horse himself is; that is, the horse moves badly.

1525 · Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will (De Servo Arbitrio) 167

Though I consider that I have now abundantly satisfied the godly man, who wishes to believe the truth without making resistance. For if we believe it to be true, that God fore-knows and fore-ordains all things; that He can be neither deceived nor hindered in His Prescience and Predestination; and that nothing can take place but according to His Will, (which reason herself is compelled to confess;) then, even according to the testimony of reason herself, there can be no “Free-will” — in man, — in angel, — or in any creature! Hence: — If we believe that Satan is the prince of this world, ever ensnaring and fighting against the kingdom of Christ with all his powers; and that he does not let go his captives without being forced by the Divine Power of the Spirit; it is manifest, that there can be no such thing as — “Free-will!” Again: — If we believe that original sin has so destroyed us, that even in the godly who are led by the Spirit, it causes the utmost molestation by striving against that which is good; it is manifest, that there can be nothing left in a man devoid of the Spirit, which can turn itself towards good, but which must turn towards evil! Again: — If the Jews, who followed after righteousness with all their powers, ran rather into unrighteousness, while the Gentiles who followed after unrighteousness attained unto a free righteousness which they never hoped for; it is equally manifest, from their very works, and from experience, that man, without grace, can do nothing but will evil! Finally: — If we believe that Christ redeemed men by His blood, we are compelled to confess, that the whole man was lost: otherwise, we shall make Christ superfluous, or a Redeemer of the grossest part of man only, — which is blasphemy and sacrilege!

1525 · Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will (De Servo Arbitrio) 56

True it is, that we are in a place where two ways meet, and that one of them only is open, yea rather neither of them is open. But by the law it is shewn how impossible the one is, that is, to good, unless God freely give His Spirit; and how wide and easy the other is, if God leave us to ourselves. Therefore, it would not be said ridiculously, but with a necessary seriousness, to the man thus standing in a place where two ways meet, ‘go by which thou wilt,’ if he, being in reality impotent, wished to seem to himself strong, or contended that neither way was hedged up.

1525 · Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will (De Servo Arbitrio) 132

Is it for this: that “Freewill,” as being of sufficient power itself, might proudly display and sport grace on fair-days, as a superfluous ornament! Wherefore, I will invert your order of reasoning, and though no rhetorician, will establish a conclusion more firm than yours. — As many places as there are in the Holy Scriptures which make mention of assistance, so many are there which abolish “Free-will:” and they are innumerable. Therefore, if we are to go by the number of testimonies, the victory is mine. For grace is therefore needed, and the assistance of grace is therefore given, because “Free-will” can of itself do nothing; as Erasmus himself has asserted according to that ‘probable opinion’ that “Free-will” ‘cannot will any thing good.’ Therefore, when grace is commended, and the assistance of grace declared, the impotency of “Free-will” is declared at the same time. — This is a sound inference — a firm conclusion — against which, not even the gates of hell will ever prevail!

1525 · Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will (De Servo Arbitrio) 151

In a word, he distinctively sets forth “him that worketh,” and “him that worketh not,” leaving no medium between them. He declares, that righteousness is not imputed “to him that worketh,” but asserts that righteousness is imputed “to him that worketh not,” if he believe! Here is no way by which “Free-will,” with its devoted efforts and endeavours, can escape or get off: it must be numbered with “him that worketh,” or with “him that worketh not.” If it be numbered with “him that worketh,” you hear that righteousness is not imputed unto it; if it be numbered with “him that worketh not, but believeth” in God, righteousness is imputed unto it. And then, it will not be the power of “Free-will,” but the new creature by faith. But if righteousness be not imputed unto it, being “him that worketh,” then, it becomes manifest, that all its works are nothing but sins, evils, and impieties before God.

1525 · Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will (De Servo Arbitrio) 53

If thou really think, O Madam Reason! that these conclusions stand good, ‘If thou wilt — therefore thou hast a free power,’ why dost thou not follow the same thyself? For thou sayest, according to that ‘probable opinion,’ that “Free-will” cannot will any thing good. By what conclusion then can such a sentiment flow from this passage also, ‘if thou wilt keep,’ when thou sayest that the conclusion flowing from this, is, that man can will and not will freely? What! can bitter and sweet flow from the same fountain? Dost thou not here much more deride man thyself, when thou sayest, that he can keep that, which he can neither will nor choose? Therefore, neither dost thou, from thy heart, believe that this is a just conclusion, ‘if thou wilt — therefore thou hast a free power,’ although thou contendest for it with so much zeal, or, if thou dost believe it, then thou dost not, from thy heart, say, that that opinion is ‘probable,’ which holds that man cannot will good. Thus, reason is so caught in the conclusions and words of her own wisdom, that she knows not what she says, nor concerning what she speaks: nay, knows nothing but that which it is most right she should know — that “Free-will” is defended with such arguments as mutually devour, and put an end to each other; just as the Midianites destroyed each other by mutual slaughter, when they fought against Gideon and the people of God.

1525 · Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will (De Servo Arbitrio) 60

It must, however, be a certain stupor or lethargy which can hold, that the power of “Free-will” is confirmed by these words “turn ye,” “if thou wilt turn,” and the like, and does not see, that for the same reason, it must be confirmed by this Scripture also, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart,” seeing that, the meaning of Him who commands and requires is the same in both instances. For the loving of God, is not less required than our conversion, and the keeping of all the commandments; because, the loving of God is our real conversion. And yet, no one attempts to prove “Free-will” from that command ‘to love,’ although from those words “if thou wilt,” “if thou wilt hear,” “turn ye”, and the like, all attempt to prove it. If therefore from that word, “love the Lord thy God with all thy heart,” it does not follow that “Free-will” is any thing or can do anything, it is certain that it neither follows from these words, “if thou wilt,” “if thou wilt hear,” “turn ye,” and the like, which either require less, or require with less force of importance, than these words “Love God!” “Love the Lord!” Whatever, therefore, is said against drawing a conclusion in support of “Free-will” from this word “love God,” the same must be said against drawing a conclusion in support of “Free-will” from every other word of command or requirement. For, if by the command ‘to love,’ the nature of the law only be shewn, and what we ought to do, but not the power of the will or what we can do, but rather, what we cannot do, the same is shewn by all the other Scriptures of requirement. For it is well known, that even the schoolmen, except the Scotinians and moderns, assert, that man cannot love God with all his heart. Therefore, neither can he perform any one of the other precepts, for all the rest, according to the testimony of Christ, hang on this one. Hence, by the testimony even of the doctors of the schools, this remains as a settled conclusion: — that the words of the law do not prove the power of “Free-will,” but shew what we ought to do, and what we cannot do.

1525 · Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will (De Servo Arbitrio) 164

But now, since God has put my salvation out of the way of my will, and has taken it under His own, and has promised to save me, not according to my working or manner of life, but according to His own grace and mercy, I rest fully assured and persuaded that He is faithful, and will not lie, and moreover great and powerful, so that no devils, no adversities can destroy Him, or pluck me out of His hand. “No one (saith He) shall pluck them out of My hand, because My Father which gave them Me is greater than all.” (John x. 27-28). Hence it is certain, that in this way, if all are not saved, yet some, yea, many shall be saved; whereas by the power of “Free-will,” no one whatever could be saved, but all must perish together.

1525 · Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will (De Servo Arbitrio) 101

If then those effects take place, they do not take place but according to the will of God. Hence, therefore, what God wills, that He loves and hates. Now then, tell me, for what merit did God love Jacob or hate Esau, before they wrought, or were born? Wherefore it stands manifest, that Paul most rightly adduces Malachi in support of the passage from Moses: that is, that God therefore called Jacob before he was born, because He loved him; but that He was not first loved by Jacob, nor moved to love him from any merit in him. So that, in the cases of Jacob and Esau, it is shewn — what ability there is in our “Free-will”!